Monday, February 13, 2012

Ten “Rules of Engagement” for UN Intervention in Syria

As they continue to decide the terms of a potential United Nations intervention in Syria, UN Security Council members should consider ten core strategies that may contribute to the effectiveness and success of a UN mission to Syria. These “rules of engagement” are based on a critical review of professional experience from previous UN and NATO missions in Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as reflected in policy literature. These “rules of engagement” could also provide important considerations for the design of future UN missions in other contexts as well. Each proposed “rule” is accompanied by a series of resources produced by HPCR as well as other relevant sources.


1.     Fill the security gap as the primary goal of the intervention

The primary goal of a potential UN intervention in Syria is to stop the violence, impose a cease-fire on the parties, and disarm militias, with the purpose of ensuring the protection of the population and the maintenance of public infrastructure. As witnessed in previous missions, such an endeavor is particularly complex in a society that has lived under authoritarian rule for decades and is fragmented along ethnic lines. The displacement of the previous regime is likely to unleash further tensions and rivalries as factions attempt to fill the security and political gap. It is imperative that any UN-mandated peacekeeping forces enjoy primacy over the maintenance of law and order, as well as retain the authority to use force in self-defense and in defense of civilians. The military capabilities and experience of the peace operations members is of greater importance than their national origin. This mission should operate under a unified command structure, responding to a very capable and astute military leadership.


2.     Clarify mission objectives

As demonstrated in previous negotiations, the text of UNSC resolutions is often the product of difficult negotiation, which privilege the lowest common denominator among UNSC members. These negotiations often result vague language that comes at a high cost in terms of clarity of objectives. And it is typically upon this lack of clarity of the objectives that resources are mobilized and strategies and tactics are developed. UNSC members are well advised to take the time and effort necessary to devise security and political objectives that are adapted to the situation in Syria and that are drafted in a way that provides clear ultimate goals, timelines, and sequences for UN action. While these terms can be potentially revised in light of developments in the field, they are likely to be critical to the mission in its first months.


3.     Establish an independent monitoring, reporting, and fact-finding mission to investigate violations of IHL and human rights

Syria lacks a legacy of transparency and credible information-sharing mechanisms. It will be critical in this context to ensure the collection, analysis, and inquiries on past, present, and future violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law by all parties concerned, including peace operations members. These efforts are critical to the establishment of a transparent and accountable process based on international standards of practice in monitoring and reporting. As the Syrian society prepares to seek justice and undertake processes for reconciliation, the ability of a UN mission to demonstrate transparent and accountable monitoring and reporting mechanisms will be a great asset.


4.     Set the terms of a national justice and reconciliation process

The UNSC should consider setting the terms for the creation of a justice and reconciliation mechanism at the national level in order to gather information on past violations of human rights law and other grievances. Setting those terms could also provide a means to open the space for forward-looking dialogue on a political transition. This justice and reconciliation mechanism should, at a minimum, be empowered to collect evidence, interview witnesses, and develop dossiers, which may be transferred to a specially designated criminal court established under a hybrid system, such as in the case of Sierra Leone. Without a sufficient justice and reconciliation process, it is unlikely that the UN can provide enough grounds for a political transformation in light of the reported cases of abuse and discrimination.


5.     Adopt a clear timeline for the rehabilitation of political institutions

Many past missions have stumbled in (re)establishing viable political institutions. The planning of these efforts suffered from being too vague and too hastily instituted, as well as from not sufficiently involving actors at the national and local level in their design. The UNSC should ensure that, from the text of the resolution onward, a timeline is adopted for the purpose of providing a clear horizon for the reestablishment of political authorities based on democratic values and respect for human rights.


6.     Ensure respect for humanitarian law and human rights by peace operations members

As noted above, a core goal of a potential UN intervention is to stop violence against civilians. In doing so, the UNSC should ensure that contributing troops are properly trained and informed about their legal obligations under IHL and human rights law. The UNSC should also ensure that contributing governments are committed and able to investigate alleged violations, enforce these rules, and provide remedies for victims. Experience has shown that violations of basic human rights occur even in the hands of the best-trained and equipped military forces.


7.     Respect and promote independent, neutral, and effective humanitarian action

Some UN missions — while attempting to increase the efficiency of the intervention and the coordination among humanitarian actors — have been tempted to use relief operations as a means to win the “hearts and minds” of the population toward the political objectives of the mission. This short-sighted strategy has, over time, endangered the core principles of neutrality and independence of humanitarian action in many situations. As with other emergency operations, coordinating and integrating humanitarian activities — in terms of security management, logistics, transport, and communications — are critical aspects of efficiency and efficacy. Yet, the perception of neutrality and impartiality is of great value, not only for the humanitarian organizations, but for the overall UN mission as well. Understanding that the welfare of the population is a priority, it is imperative for the UN mission’s legitimacy that humanitarian actors not be interfered with. By prioritizing the welfare of the population in times of emergency, the UN mission will foster political support from communities as it aims to create sustainable political processes.


8.     Focus on maintaining public infrastructure

As seen in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, the legitimacy of the mission will rely partly on its ability to facilitate the restoration of public services in key sectors, such as health, water and sanitation, education, and power supply.. Efforts should be made to curtail, as much as possible, the need for emergency relief assistance. The UN should invest, where possible, in maintaining and rebuilding the capacity of public authorities to deliver essential services. Syria is a mid-level developing country that may not require emergency assistance beyond a few weeks following the reestablishment of public order. Restoring this capacity is of primary importance for both logistical and political reasons. In this context, the UN mission should avoid calling in major development agencies to undertake direct interventions in place of the the government. These programs, as demonstrated in previous missions, draw extensive human resources away from public authorities and increase the sense of the population that it has lost control over the process of transition. While agencies can provide technical support to ministries and municipalities, they will need to be patient as those entities are rebuilding their capacity and legitimacy within the communities.


9.     Build on coping capabilities at the community level

Ultimately, a large part of the success of the UN mission will be in the hands of local communities and the extent to which they buy into the political transition. In this context, political, security, and development agendas should be geared toward supporting coping mechanisms at the community level to reinitiate economic development, trade, and communication with the outside world. The UN system still has a lot to learn from local NGOs on how to engage with communities, particularly dealing with local mediation efforts, community mobilization, human rights culture, and social development. The UNSC should consider mandating its mission to work closely with Syrian civil society, as well as international NGOs with expertise in peacebuilding at the community level, in order to jump start projects that can have an immediate impact on the perceptions and buy-in of the communities.


10.  Communicate and engage with local leaders

Many of the previous missions stumbled due to the absence of a consolidated leadership at the national level with which the missions could engage on political reforms. Attempts to import such leadership from the more educated and savvy diaspora has typically failed to mobilize the support of the population toward the transition process. However expedient such temptations are, a UN mission to Syria should be given the space and time to communicate and engage with local leaders and seek their contribution in defining the process, agenda, and timeline of political transition and social reconstruction. Such an approach promotes democratic values, and also helps to ensure that political forces from the diaspora, with limited stake into local economic and social development, are allowed to participate in the national reconciliation efforts yet not to dictate the terms of it. This type of engagement is necessarily time consuming, requires proper language and cultural skills, and is fraught with local dilemmas for which the UN cannot always provide much support or solutions. Yet, as the fundamental rehabilitation of a political system will take place at the community level, as demonstrated in other instances of UN intervention, communities should see themselves — and should be seen — as important partners of the UN in this process.
Posted by at No comments:

Friday, February 10, 2012

Syria: Time to Reflect on the Responsibility to Protect?


Over the recent days, several calls have been made to apply the recently adopted doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the situation of Syria, in view of the mounting violence and death toll among civilians. According to a poll published by Reuters, a majority of the French population would back a UN military intervention in Syria. Russian and Chinese objections to UN intervention on the basis of the respect of state sovereignty has been severely criticized by Western powers and global public opinion in general.

This type of argument is far from being new. While the concept of R2P arose in the early 2000s out of the dramatic experience resulting from UN inaction in Rwanda and the indecisiveness of NATO in Srebrenica, there are still a number of political and professional questions associated to the implementation of such a norm. Many argue that R2P has not reached the level of an international legal rule, which therefore doesn’t set clear obligations for states, including Russia and China as members of the Security Council, regarding its implementation.

Rightly so, the Security Council adopted a resolution in 2005, subjecting coercive measures under R2P to the traditional rules pertaining to the veto of the organization. Since then, the doctrine has slowly lost some of its appeal, due to the inability of its protagonists to specify clear benchmarks that would trigger such interventions (i.e. what constitutes a genocide, crime against humanity, or war crime, justifying the use of force), and to define what type of measures could effectively prevent, mitigate, or prohibit these violations in the first place.

In view of the lack of consensus among professionals on when and how to intervene, as well as how to rebuild a stable society respectful of human rights after such an intervention, states have become increasingly nervous that R2P could be used on political grounds to interfere into the affairs of other states. While some denounce the potential politicization of the doctrine, others recognize that military interventions under R2P precisely need political mobilization without which no state would commit the required resources, particularly military, to stop atrocities. In other words, foreign policy goals, rather than systematic definitions, are likely to dictate military interventions. In such a case, there has been a clear tension between those who want to better define triggers, means, and methods of R2P, and those who want it to remain vague as a practical matter to mobilize support in times of crisis.

Ultimately, R2P may well become an accepted concept, paradoxically when it will be no longer required. By defining sovereignty as a responsibility, rather than a privilege, and by intervening in a preventive manner, rather than through military force, states will evidentially agree that a major failure of an international system based on human rights requires the collective use of force to re-establish international order. In this context, the Russian and Chinese veto, as frustrating and dramatic as it may be in the case of Syria, is more reflective of their perceptions of an international system based on human rights, than on the pros and cons of intervening in Syria. 

For the time being, much more needs to be done in building a consensus on the means and methods of implementing R2P. In particular, much work needs to be invested in researching the military objectives and tactics of such operations, the role and responsibilities of humanitarian organizations, in establishing clear protocols to rebuild broken societies in line with human rights values and norms, and in prompting processes of reconciliation as a premise for sustainable peace. Therefore, denouncing the veto power of Russia and China will have real significance only when the protagonists of R2P will have a clear understanding of what needs to be put into the resolution in the first place.

Posted by at 1 comment:

Thursday, February 2, 2012

Unreliable security and access jeopardize effective delivery of emergency relief in Somalia.



Following consistent blockade of aid delivery by local authorities in regions controlled by Al-Shabaab, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced that it has suspended all food and seed distributions to the areas until local authorities cooperate in maintaining secure and unobstructed access to populations in need. The current situation in Somalia has heightened on-going dilemmas of humanitarian access. According to UNOCHA, while the humanitarian need of populations should determine where relief efforts are directed, the prevailing security environment remains a deciding factor in the ability of professionals to operate. Humanitarian relief efforts require the assurance of a secure environment and unimpeded access in order to effectively deliver aid to affected populations. If the conditions for humanitarian assistance are undermined or impeded, aid is jeopardized.

Humanitarian organizations face a constant challenge as they implement their activities according to international humanitarian law in complex environments. Under IHL, humanitarian assistance is deemed to be independent, impartial, and neutral. Its core purpose is to support authorities in the fulfilment of their obligations to provide for the needs of the populations under their control. While there is a dilemma regarding the actual responsibilities of the Al-Shabaab movement to the Somali population under their control, Article 3 of the IVth Geneva Convention recognizes the Al-Shabaab movement as the practical counterpart to the ICRC in negotiating access. In particular, negotiation at the political level must take place in order to ensure that local and national authorities maintain adequate access to populations in need, recognizing the mandate of humanitarian organizations and their requirements in terms of operational independence.

There has yet to be a consensus on means and methods to seek the consent of local authorities in these circumstances, as well as the type of support expected from them in ensuring the security of staff and the delivery of assistance. Despite the need to operate under the principles of humanitarian action, aid workers must obtain guarantees of safety, for example through escort by local authorities and assurance of safe passage through controlled areas to reach populations in need. Ultimately, there are no clear prescriptions regarding the acceptable level of risks in view of the particular humanitarian benefits. Absence of a proper method to do a cost-benefit analysis complicates the elaboration of protocols of access.

As noted by UNOCHA, daily assessments of security in a given environment are critical to ensuring that humanitarian operations are implemented whenever and wherever possible. Considering the complexities of working in dangerous and highly complex environments, such as Somalia, humanitarian professionals must come to a consensus regarding means and methods to effectively deliver aid.

For more information, refer to:


ICRC News Release: "ICRC temporarily suspends distributions of food and seed"

IRIN News Article: "Somalia: ICRC suspends aid deliveries"

ICRC News Release: "ICRC remains fully committed to helping Somalis"
Posted by at No comments:

Tuesday, January 31, 2012

ODI/Stimson Center Report: UN integrated missions present renewed challenges to humanitarian action

A recent report published by the UK Overseas Development Institute and the US Stimson Center assesses the impact of integrated missions on humanitarian response in conflict-affected regions. While integration of UN missions remains a polarizing issue, according to the report, such an approach is expected to remain an enduring operating procedure for the UN as a whole that will impact upon the doctrine and professional standards of humanitarian agencies for the years to come.

Through the integration of political, peacekeeping, and humanitarian objectives, the UN is mandated to support national and regional political processes aimed at promoting and maintaining peace and security, while also providing emergency relief assistance to populations in need. Humanitarian assistance, as recognized under international humanitarian law, must be provided in accordance with the principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality. As a result, the amalgam of humanitarian activities with political and security agendas is often perceived among humanitarian professionals as a major threat to their modus operandi and the distinctiveness of the “humanitarian space”. Many believe that the integration of security, political, and humanitarian objectives may confuse parties to armed conflicts and endanger humanitarian access to vulnerable groups. Interestingly, the ODI/Stimson report observes that there is no concluding evidence that integrated missions have caused greater insecurity among humanitarian workers.

Moving forward, the ODI/Stimson report recommends the implementation of a pragmatic approach at the field level to ensure greater cooperation and clarity on the distinct missions of UN agencies operating in the same environment, particularly in light of differing perspectives regarding direct engagement with non-state armed groups. Given that pressure toward greater integration has become a common feature of UN mandates, humanitarian professionals must therefore reach a new consensus among themselves on how to cooperate with colleagues from the security and political mediation sectors on a case-by-case basis. With respect to the risks faced by humanitarian professionals working within an integrated mission framework, further research is required to assess the nature and level of associated risks to their operational access.

For further reading, refer to:

HPN: Humanitarian action in Afghanistan: an uphill battle








Posted by at No comments:

Monday, January 30, 2012

International Islamic charities facing increased restrictions under counter-terrorism regulations in Israel, UK, and US for their activities in Gaza.


International Islamic charities facing increased restrictions under counter-terrorism regulations in Israel, UK, and US for their activities in Gaza.

According to a recent article published on IRIN News, Islamic charities in Gaza are challenged by both Israeli bureaucracy and no-contact policies of Western donors toward Hamas, a branded terror organization under both US and UK laws, which controls the Gaza Strip.

Following the decision of US Supreme Court in the Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project in June 2010, the US government, in particular USAID, has imposed additional restrictions on grantees working in the Gaza Strip, which limits or even prohibits contact with Hamas representatives. In addition, the Office for Foreign Asset Control at the US Department of the Treasury (OFAC), has been monitoring all potential ways in which funds can find their way toward Hamas, as a designated foreign terrorist organization. Such measures have in effect stifled interaction with the authorities in control of Gaza and have arguably hindered humanitarian programs in favor of vulnerable groups in the Strip.

Such situations appear to contravene with basic international humanitarian law, which calls for unimpeded access to civilian populations affected by the conflict. Israel and all the contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions are required to facilitate access to the population in need in the Gaza Strip.

Such tensions between emerging counter-terrorism regulations and traditional humanitarian law precepts have become apparent in the cases of Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan over the coming years, essentially conditioning financial assistance to life-saving programs that satisfy growing security and political requirements.

The future of neutral and independent humanitarian assistance in regions controlled by armed groups designated as terrorist organizations will require common efforts to delineate a new balance between humanitarian imperative and national security priorities. 

For more information on these deliberations, please visit www.hpcrresearch.org/research/criminalizing-humanitarian-engagement.

Posted by at No comments:

Sunday, January 29, 2012

Yemen: Lack of data hampers emergency food aid, according to UNICEF



According to Geert Cappelaere, head of the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Yemen, donors are insisting to receive convincing evidence before proceeding with their assistance toward emergency food aid. Yet, for UNICEF, dealing with malnutrition is a priority.  "Why do you want children to die first before you’re going to give any credibility to a disaster looming here in Yemen?” Said Cappelaere.


With the increasing pressure for accountability, aid agencies are often confronted with the programmatic dilemma of providing quantifiable evidence of malnutrition in situations where access to the field - and even more data, is made difficult by the circumstances of the conflict.


See: IRIN News
See: Malnutrition in Yemen: Developing an Urgent and Effective Response
Posted by at No comments:
Location: Hadramaut, Yémen
Subscribe to: Comments (Atom)